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Abstract 
Nursing home care is arguably the largest financial risk for the elderly without private or social 
insurance coverage.  The annual out-of-pocket expenditure can easily exceed $70,000. Despite 
the substantial financial burdens on the elderly, the understanding of nursing home self-pay 
prices is rather sparse due to data limitation. To bridge the gap in the literature, we collected a 
unique and longitudinal price dataset from eight states, spanning from 2005 to 2010, to advance 
the understanding of the determinants and geographical variations of nursing home price and 
price growth. Overall, nursing home prices have consistently outpaced the inflation of consumer 
prices, particularly in California and Oregon. We also see faster price growth in markets where 
they face stricter capacity constraints and have higher for-profit market shares. Organizational 
structures are also significantly associated with price variations. We find that nonprofit nursing 
homes have higher prices than for-profit nursing homes and that chain-affiliated nursing homes 
charge higher prices than nonchains counterparts.  
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Currently, there are more than 1.4 million people in the U.S. live in nursing homes, and it 
is estimated that a typical American at the age of 65 has a 35% chance of requiring nursing home 
care sometime in his or her lifetime (CDC, 2016). Institutionalized long-stay nursing home care 
is expensive. For example, the annual median price in 2010 was $110,025 in the state of New 
York.1  Since most Americans do not purchase long-term care insurance to cover these expenses 
(Lin & Prince 2013), out-of-pocket nursing home expenditure is a primary driver of 
precautionary savings and wealth accumulation (Kopecky & Koreshkova 2014). The non-
Medicaid eligible elderly pay for nursing home care out of savings and once depleted, they 
depend on Medicaid. As of 2016, Medicaid spent over $51 billion per year on nursing home care 
(Medpac 2016).  
New Contribution 
Despite the substantial financial risk for the elderly, the understanding of nursing home 
private-pay prices is rather sparse due to data limitations. To bridge the gap in the literature, we 
evaluate unique price data that we collected for eight states and the years 2005 through 2010, 
combined with structural information of nursing facilities, to understand the association between 
organizational and market structures and private-pay prices. In particular, we are interested in 
whether for-profit (FP) ownership, chain affiliation, market concentration, and capacity 
constraints have significant associations with the level and growth of nursing home private-pay 
prices. Though our findings are not necessarily causal, we expect the results to facilitate a better 
use of the elderly’s assets and wealth, inform policies enhancing the value of nursing home care, 
                                                     




improve the sustainability of social insurance programs (e.g. Medicaid), and shed light on the 
directions for future research. 
Nursing Home Private-Pay Prices 
Private-pay expenditures at skilled nursing facilities represent a major financial burden for 
the elderly not eligible for Medicaid (Kopecky & Koreshkova 2014). Current and continued 
price growth affects the affordability of nursing home care for these elderly. Out-of-pocket 
payments are estimated to account for 33% of formal long-term care spending among the elderly, 
while only 4% of the expenditure is paid through private insurance (CBO 2004; Catlin, Cowan, 
Stephen, & Washington 2007). Such expenses have also been increasing drastically. For 
example, between 2002 and 2011, the nominal median private-pay price increased by 56.7% in 
California.2 As escalating prices depletes resources of paying seniors, more seniors will convert 
to Medicaid, increasing the financial burden to public funding sources.   
Within the limited studies that have examined pricing in nursing homes, Stewart, 
Grabowski, and Lakdawalla (2009) examined the evolution of private-pay prices from 1977 to 
2004 but did not explore facility or market variation in prices. Nyman (1994) used data from 
Wisconsin nursing homes in 1988 to show that higher market concentration of nursing homes led 
to higher prices. Likewise, Mukamel and Spector (2002) calculated private-pay markups above 
marginal costs and above Medicaid rates using a sample of FP NHs in New York State in 1991. 
Recent studies have shifted focus more to the relationship between public quality reporting and 
prices. For example, Clement, Bazzoli, and Zhao (2012) used Wisconsin nursing home data and 
found no effect of quality reporting on prices for medium- or high-quality homes. Among low 
quality homes, they found a small increase in prices and reductions in restraint use. Huang and 
                                                     




Hirth (2016) used price information from five representative states and found that the five-star 
quality rating system widened the price differential between the top- and bottom-rated nursing 
homes. They also found a stronger price effect in less-concentrated markets where consumers are 
more likely to have choices of alternative nursing homes.  
Relative to the existing literature, this paper uses a larger dataset, including more recent 
prices to study the relationship between nursing home private-pay price, organizational type, and 
market structure. First, both FP and nonprofit (NFP), as well as chain and nonchain nursing 
homes, coexist in the same markets. Differences in profit motives, tax status, quality of care, and 
access to resources can lead to price variations between nursing homes with different 
organizational types. Second, we expect that market variations in capacity and competition also 
will impact prices. Our paper examines the relationships between these potential determinants 
and nursing home private-pay price. 
Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Development 
Nearly 70% of all nursing homes in the United States are FP (Schlesinger & Gray, 2006). 
Because NFP organizations are restricted from sharing profits with owners and managers 
(Hansman, 1980), FP and NFP nursing homes are thought to be motivated differently. This has 
led to an abundant literature that studies the differences between FP and NFP nursing homes 
(e.g., Weech-Maldonado et al. 2012; Grabowski, Feng, Hirth, Rahman, & Mor 2013). However, 
what is less known is how private-pay prices may differ between FP and NFP nursing homes. 
Several competing hypotheses suggest a mixed relationship between FP ownership and 
prices. First, for the same level of quality provided, a more explicit and stronger profit motive 
should lead to higher prices at FP nursing homes. Second, FP nursing homes may be more 




market shares. Third, NFP nursing homes are exempted from business taxes and sometimes can 
issue tax-exempt bonds, which can lower their financing costs. These tax advantages should 
provide some pricing flexibility and lead to lower prices at NFP nursing homes, holding all else 
equal.  
Last but not least, the literature found that NFP nursing homes generally provide better 
quality (Chou 2002; Grabowski et al. 2013). This leads to the fourth hypothesis that NFP nursing 
homes charge higher private-pay prices that reflect the better quality of care they provide. 
Synthesizing these hypotheses and opposite predictions, because several of them can occur at the 
same time, the net relationship between FP ownership and private-pay prices remains an 
empirical question. Limited by the scope of this study, we do not attempt to identify the causal 
mechanism that drives the price difference (if any) between FP and NFP nursing homes. Rather, 
our goal is to examine whether there is a statistical difference between the private-pay prices at 
FP and NFP nursing homes and we expect the results will serve the foundation that motivates 
and guides future research.  
Second, more than 50% of nursing homes are affiliated to a multifacility chain and, as a 
result, the literature has compared chain to nonchain nursing homes for numerous outcomes, yet 
without studying the difference in prices (Grabowski et al. 2016; Harrington, Olney, Carrillo, & 
Kang 2012; You et al. 2016). More importantly, the literature mostly focuses on FP chains and 
ignores the existence of NFP chains. We expect that both FP and NFP chains will have better 
access to resources and be better able to implement standardized practices. Therefore, in our 
analysis, we compare four organizational types: FP nonchains, FP chains, NFP nonchains, and 




In terms of market structures, because the market concentration of nursing home markets 
varies geographically, it creates a great opportunity to study the relationship between market 
concentration and price as well as whether the relationship between price and organizational 
types varies with market concentration. We expect that in less concentrated markets and when 
the availability of alternative nursing homes is greater, there will be a larger price difference with 
organizational type.  
We also expect to see higher prices and faster price growth where markets have stricter 
capacity constraints. If we see larger price variations between organizational types in less 
capacity-constrained markets, the price variation may be the result of price competition and 
product differentiation of different levels of quality. In this case, price differences between 
organizational types are likely a reflection of different operating costs at nursing homes and, 
therefore, should not be of much concern. However, if we see larger price variations in markets 
with stricter capacity constraints, it may suggest that certain nursing homes raise prices to extract 
consumer surplus. In this case, it may warrant policies to relax the capacity constraints. 
Data and Empirical Strategies 
Data 
The level and annual change of private-pay prices are the primary outcomes of interest. We 
extract price information from the state-administered nursing home cost reports, which we 
obtained from health agencies for the period 2005 through 2010 in eight states — California, 
Florida, Georgia, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont. Health agencies in these states 
collect Medicaid cost reports containing detailed and reliable information about nursing home 
revenues and resident payer mix. We use the annual average consumer price index to adjust for 




California, Florida, and Ohio are further required to report their revenues by routine patient care 
or ancillary services. The richness of information allows us to calculate daily average private-pay 
prices. To enhance the comparability of price information across nursing homes, when possible, 
we exclude ancillary revenues outside direct patient care.3 Because the cost reporting forms have 
slightly different classification methods, direct comparison across states should be taken with 
caution.4 To account for potential reporting and administrative errors, we also exclude 
observations with the highest and lowest 1% of private-pay price and percentages of price 
change. We also exclude hospital-based nursing homes because they serve different populations. 
Government nursing homes are also excluded. The analytic sample includes more than 3,700 
unique NHs per year, equivalent to 25% of U.S. freestanding facilities. To our knowledge, our 
price measure closely represents the out-of-pocket expenditures borne by residents ineligible for 
Medicaid. We merge the price information with the LTC Focus dataset maintained by the Brown 
University and the Area Health Resources Files (AHRF). 
Empirical Methods 
We first compare prices and price growth between organizational- and market-level 
characteristics, including FP status, chain ownership, market competition, and proxies for 
capacity constraints. Second, we compare the results from two sets of regressions that control for 
                                                     
3 We are able to have cleaner routine care prices for California, Florida, and Ohio. Private-pay price in 
California was calculated as the skilled nursing care revenues dividing by skilled nursing care days. 
Because Texas and New York reports do not separate revenues from routine and ancillary care, the direct 
comparison of prices across states should be taken with caution. Georgia discloses private-pay prices 
directly.  
4 Report forms are consistent within states during our study period. The detailed report form of each state 




observable nursing home, market, and state characteristics. The first model utilizes the ordinary 
least squares regression and controls for state- and year-fixed effects. The second model includes 
additional county-fixed effects. Both models have their own advantages and limitations. While 
the county-fixed effect model is considered more statistically robust, many market-level 
variables of our interest have limited changes over time, and thus, the county-fixed effect model 
may have limited statistical power due to small variations. For completeness, we present and 
compare the results from both models. In addition, because FP ownership is our main variable of 
interest and it does not change frequently, we do not adopt a nursing home-fixed effect model 
and acknowledge the limitation. Overall, the baseline model is as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽01  + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡     Eq (1) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents the average nursing home private-pay price (per day) and the annual price 
growth for a nursing home i in year t. NH represents a set of NH-level variables, including the FP 
status, chain affiliation, FP and chain interactions (i.e. FP chain and NFP chain), occupancy rate, 
number of beds, and payer mix. M is a set of market-level characteristics, including the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on the number of beds, log-transformed median 
household income, local unemployment rates, and density of the elderly population. R represents 
resident-level characteristics that are aggregated at the facility level, including racial and gender 
composition, age, average activities of daily living (ADL) index, and the acuity index. Medicaid 
Rate is the state average of Medicaid reimbursement rates.5 S and T represent for state- and year-
fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at nursing homes.6 
                                                     
5 Because the Medicaid rates are not available in 2010, we use 2009 rates in both 2009 and 2010. 




Results and Discussions: 
 Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics are presented in Table 1. We report the summary statistics by four 
organizational types. These include FP chain (column (2)), FP non-chain (column (3)), NFP 
chain (column (4)), and NFP nonchain (column (5)). FP and NFP nursing homes represent 
80.9% and 19.1% of our sample. About 59.5% and 41.2% of the FP and NFP nursing homes are 
affiliated to chains. In the sample, the average real price per day and annual price growth are 
$197.9 and 3.69 percentage points. Comparing the price and price growth between 
organizational types, on average, the NFPs have higher prices than the FPs, and chain nursing 
homes have lower prices than non-chain nursing homes have. In particular, FP chains have the 
lowest average price as of $178.6 while NFP non-chains have the highest average price at 
$242.4. NFP non-chain nursing homes also have the fastest annual price growth of 3.95% and 
NFP chains have the slowest price growth at 2.87%. For other facility-level characteristics, FP 
chain-owned and NFP non-chain nursing homes have the lowest and highest occupancy rates at 
83.45% and 90.71%, respectively. NFP non-chain nursing homes are the largest with 144.3 beds 
on average, while FP chain nursing homes on average only have 109.1 beds. In terms of payer 
mix, FP nursing homes have significantly higher percentages of revenues from Medicaid- and 
Medicare-pay residents and NFP nursing homes are more dependent on private-pay residents. 
NFP chain nursing homes on average have 30.1% of their revenues paid by private payers, while 
that number is only 18.9% for the FP non-chain nursing homes. Among resident characteristics, 
residents at NFP nursing homes are more likely to be female, white, and older. We also find 
interesting differences in market structures. For example, on average, FP and NFP chains are 




chains are 0.166 and 0.162, while market HHIs are only 0.123 and 0.122 for FP and NFP non-
chain nursing homes. Both FP and NFP chain-owned nursing homes are also located in areas 
with lower elderly density and Medicaid reimbursement rates. Geographically, FP non-chains are 
disproportionately more likely located in California (32.9%), while NFP chains are more likely 
located in New York (35.4%). 
 Prices, Organizational Types, and Market Structures 
Table 2 provides more detailed look of distributions and time trends for prices between 
states, organizational types, and market structures. We show the nominal price and price growth 
in Table 2 to facilitate comparison with general consumer and medical care price inflations. 
Panel A exhibits the price and price growth in each state. During the study period, the annualized 
inflation in general consumer and medical prices are 2.23% and 3.74% respectively. Nursing 
homes in New York have the highest prices. The median prices are $260.24 in 2005 and $309.29 
in 2010. Yet, we also find slower price growth in New York. Its prices grow 18.85% from 2005 
to 2010, an annualized growth rate at 3.51%. Nursing homes in Texas have the lowest median 
price, just $124.14 in 2010.  Among all states, during the period from 2005 through 2010, we 
find the fastest price growth in California and Vermont at 29.72% and 26.54%, respectively. In 
terms of annualized price growth, California and Oregon have the highest rates at 5.34% and 
7.15% respectively. In Panel B, we show the price and price growth by different organizational 
structures. FP chains have the lowest prices and NFP non-chains have the highest prices. As in 
2010, the median prices are $188.95 and $236.58 respectively. Interestingly, despite having the 
highest prices, NFP non-chains have the slowest price growth compared to others. In Panel C, we 
stratify the sample by market concentration and occupancy rates. Following the guidelines issued 




concentrated. We find a counter-intuitive result that the median price is actually higher in less 
concentrated markets ($205.50 vs. $162.56), and these areas also show faster price growth 
(4.49% vs. 3.68%). This is probably correlated to urban-rural differences.  
In addition, we find that nursing homes in markets where occupancy rates are higher than 
the median value have higher prices ($209.40 vs. $124.27) and faster price growth. The 
cumulative and annualized price growth are 28.78% (vs. 18.04%) and 5.19% (vs. 3.37%). This 
suggests that under capacity constraints, both the level and growth of prices are higher and faster. 
Overall, comparing the descriptive statistics, we find higher prices and faster price growth in 
markets with capacity constraints, and that are less concentrated. 
Main Regression Results 
In the regression analysis, we focus on the log-transformed price and the percentage price 
growth. For each outcome, we run three different regressions. The first regression uses the entire 
sample and controls for state-fixed effects. In the second regression, we restrict the sample to 
nursing homes having at least five private-pay residents, equivalent to 1,825 private-pay days in 
a year. While nursing home residents may have different lengths of stay, this restriction implies 
that at least five nursing home beds are filled by private-pay residents through the year. The third 
regression also uses the sample with at least five private-pay residents and adds county-fixed 
effects. We run both the state- and county-fixed effects models because state-fixed effects allow 
cross-sectional variations between markets but do not account for unobservable market-level 
variables, and county-fixed effects control for both state- and market-unobservable factors but 
only allow time-series variations within markets. Each model has its own limitations and for 
completeness, we present both sets of results. Table 3 shows the main results. In column (1), FP 




non-chains. The county-fixed effects model (column (3)) also shows lower price but the 
coefficient is statistically insignificant. In terms of price growth, the negative signs of the 
coefficients suggest that FP non-chains may have slower price growth but the difference is not 
statistically insignificant (columns (4) - (6)). We also find nursing home-level occupancy rates 
and facility sizes were associated with higher prices but not necessarily with faster price growth.  
Consistent with the summary statistics, we find statistically significant evidence that NFP 
chains have highest prices and FP chains have the lowest prices. We find similar but statistically 
weaker patterns in price growth. In terms of payer mix, higher Medicaid-pay shares are 
associated with lower prices but no significant relationship with price growth. When nursing 
homes have higher Medicare-pay shares, they have higher private-pay prices and faster price 
growth. A one percentage point increase in Medicare-pay share is associated with 0.19 to 0.2 
percent increase in private-pay prices.  
Interestingly, we find that higher market HHI is associated with lower prices without 
controlling for county-fixed effects (columns (1) and (2)). However, after controlling for county-
fixed effects (column (3)), higher HHI is associated with higher prices. We don’t find a 
statistically significant and consistent relationship in price growth (columns (4), (5), and (6)). 
Given that the regression specification using county-fixed effects is considered more robust and 
accounts for unobservable and time-invariant market-level factors, we favor the result that 




The Roles of Market Structures 
In Tables 4 and 5, we report analyses on stratified samples based on the whether the 
market HHIs are above/below 0.157 and whether the market-level occupancy rates are 
above/below the median value (87.63%). The goal of these analyses is to examine whether the 
relationship between prices and organizational types varies depending on market structures. In 
Table 4, we find that results of organizational types are qualitatively consistent between two 
strata, albeit the insignificance in the more concentrated markets may be due to a smaller sample 
size. In the same panel, on the other hand, we see a stronger association between facility-level 
occupancy rates and prices in the more concentrated markets. This finding suggests that 
individual nursing homes are more likely to raise prices under capacity constraints when there is 
limited competition from other facilities. The results of price growth in Panel B are mixed and 
mostly statistically insignificant. In Table 5, we show the results of stratified samples by the 
market-level occupancy rates. In Panel A, we find more profound price variations between 
organizational types in markets that have higher median occupancy rates. Again, there is no 
statistically significant difference in price growth (Panel B). 
Discussions: 
Overall, we find that nursing home prices have consistently outpaced the general consumer 
and medical care inflations. We also find significant price variations between organizational 
types, market structures, and states. Our results suggest that NFP nursing homes, particularly 
NFP chains, charge statistically significant higher prices over FP nursing homes, possibly 
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associated with superior quality provided at NFP nursing homes (Chou 2002; Grabowski et al. 
2013). However, this raises an important question related to the justification for the tax-exempt 
status that NFP nursing homes have received. Because NFP nursing homes can and do attract 
disproportionately more private-pay residents and also charge higher prices, it is unclear whether 
NFP nursing homes provide superior quality to fulfill their charitable missions and the tax-
exempt requirement or as a business strategy to position themselves at the high-end market 
segment. The significantly lower prices at FP chains also provide a different perspective that 
although FP chains in general have lower quality but the value of care (from the perspective of 
private-pay residents) may or may not be inferior to that delivered by the NFPs because of lower 
prices to consumers. 
In addition, we find higher occupancy rates and less market competition are associated 
with higher prices. Although the Certificate-of-Need law is considered less binding in recent 
years (Grabowski, 2008), other forms of capacity regulations, both formally and informally, can 
still lead to excess demand for nursing home beds in selected markets. Therefore, increasing the 
supply of nursing home beds in markets that have high occupancy rates might help to contain 
price growth. 
Conclusions 
This paper contributes to a better understanding of nursing home price and price growth. 
Overall, we provide empirical evidence of the association between nursing home private-pay 
prices and organization types and market structures. However, we find these determinants 
explain relatively little about price growth. There are several limitations are worth mentioning 
and should be addressed in future studies. First, while we include resident characteristics to 




selection into different organization types which may bias our results. To account for this issue in 
future research, we suggest using resident-level data and the instrumental variables approach 
which theoretically can randomize the likelihood of a resident being admitted to a particular type 
of nursing homes. For example, researchers have used the differential distance between a nursing 
home resident’s prior residency to the closet NFP nursing homes and to the closet FP nursing 
home to predict the probability of a resident choosing a NFP nursing home (Grabowski et al., 
2013). Second, we do not control for quality differences between nursing homes and the 
observed price variations to some extent can be related to underlying quality. Future work should 
consider adopting structural modeling techniques that can simultaneously account for price and 
quality differences between nursing homes. Third, a more comprehensive price dataset including 
more markets and years will be useful to provide more market-level variations overtime. 
Our paper shows that nursing home prices have consistently outpaced both the consumer 
and medical care inflations. While it may partly reflect better quality and more comprehensive 
services provided at nursing homes over the study period, private-pay residents still face greater 
financial burdens. Given the significant portion of the elderly’s wealth at stake, it is important to 
understand whether the escalating prices mostly reflect better quality, or to some extent, are the 
results of market inefficiencies. In addition, we find statistically significant price differences 
between the FP and NFP as well as chain and non-chain nursing homes. The results suggest that 
when evaluating the value of nursing home care (quality over price), the private-pay price is an 
important factor to consider in future analyses.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
  All For-profit Non profit 
   Chain Ind. Chain Ind. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outcome variables 
Private price (real) 197.9 178.6 209.2 204.8 242.4 (85.56) (61.12) (102.6) (74.76) (103.1) 
% change of Private Price 3.691 3.642 3.887 2.872 3.951 (19.88) (18.17) (22.54) (17.57) (20.23) 
Facility controls 
For-profit 0.809 1 1 0 0 
Occupancy rate 85.53 83.45 86.48 86.89 90.71 (12.97) (14.05) (11.81) (11.40) (10.22) 
# of beds 116.1 109.1 118.6 107.9 144.3 (63.26) (43.33) (64.64) (61.16) (108.2) 
Chain affiliation 0.560 1 0 1 0 
Medicaid-pay share (%) 65.29 66.18 67.76 57.29 59.86 (18.55) (16.78) (18.23) (22.71) (20.78) 
Medicare-pay share (%) 13.86 14.72 13.36 12.62 12.52 (10.49) (10.29) (10.82) (9.023) (11.00) 
Patient controls 
With hypertension (%) 55.75 55.93 56.44 54.11 54.09 (15.60) (15.82) (14.82) (16.39) (16.09) 
Female (%) 68.77 67.50 67.45 73.67 74.58 (14.70) (14.15) (14.69) (14.78) (14.86) 
White (%) 74.91 74.47 71.86 80.35 81.92 (26.61) (25.76) (27.60) (24.59) (26.76) 
Hispanic 5.882 6.064 7.137 3.180 3.342 (15.38) (16.21) (15.70) (12.02) (11.96) 
Avg. age 78.92 77.93 78.62 81.65 82.20 (10.63) (10.25) (9.575) (11.71) (13.11) 
Avg. ADL 16.43 16.30 16.55 16.38 16.71 (3.345) (3.335) (3.329) (3.096) (3.564) 
Acuity index 11.55 11.53 11.65 11.42 11.47 (1.332) (1.282) (1.423) (1.226) (1.325) 
Market/state 
controls 
HHI 0.147 0.166 0.123 0.162 0.122 (0.206) (0.216) (0.193) (0.229) (0.167) 
1000s of 65+ per square 
mile 
0.234 0.110 0.320 0.170 0.559 
(0.711) (0.191) (0.782) (0.419) (1.499) 
Log (household income) 10.78 10.76 10.81 10.76 10.79 (0.231) (0.218) (0.245) (0.236) (0.227) 
Unemp. rate 6.945 7.006 6.972 6.795 6.713 (2.884) (2.886) (2.948) (2.792) (2.728) 
State Medicaid rate 168.3 158.6 174.3 168.7 192.3 (35.24) (29.71) (37.00) (34.14) (38.99) 
California 0.268 0.269 0.329 0.185 0.145 
Florida 0.121 0.110 0.115 0.177 0.151 
Georgia 0.0440 0.0580 0.0189 0.100 0.0177 
New York 0.114 0.0156 0.181 0.0995 0.354 




Oregon 0.0173 0.0261 0.00663 0.0104 0.0157 
Texas 0.204 0.262 0.165 0.171 0.0968 
Vermont 0.00854 0.00862 0.00663 0 0.0197 
Observations  22,141 10,670 7,244 1,738 2,489 
 
The mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) are reported for all, for-profit and chain for-profit and 




Table 2. Median and Growth of Private-Pay Nursing Home Prices (Nominal Price) 
Panel A. By States  
  CA FL GA OH OR NY TX VT GeneraCPI Medical Care CPI 
Nominal price 2005 157.724 166.307 N/A 164.49 160.781 260.235 104.613 191.365   
2006 167.637 172.72 135 172.954 180.806 269.661 105.044 197.47   
2007 177.231 183.827 146.00 179.696 187.695 286.91 111.33 205.215   
2008 186.937 196.972 152 187.685 200.693 292.11 115.602 219.31   
2009 195.689 204.18 155 195.712 211.966 304.762 121.825 226.952   
2010 204.6 209.189 N/A 203.032 N/A 309.288 124.139 242.145   
% Change (year over year) 2006 6.28% 3.86% N/A 5.15% 12.45% 3.62% 0.41% 3.19% 3.23% 4.00% 
2007 5.72% 6.43% 8.15% 3.90% 3.81% 6.40% 5.98% 3.92% 2.83% 4.40% 
2008 5.48% 7.15% 4.11% 4.28% 6.93% 1.81% 3.84% 6.87% 3.86% 3.70% 
2009 4.68% 3.66% 1.97% 4.44% 5.62% 4.33% 5.38% 3.48% -0.37% 3.20% 
2010 4.55% 2.45% N/A 3.74% N/A 1.49% 1.90% 6.69% 1.68% 3.40% 
2005-2010 29.72% 25.78% N/A 23.43% N/A 18.85% 18.67% 26.54% 11.67% 20.15% 
Annualized % chg.  5.34% 4.69% 4.71% 4.30% 7.15% 3.51% 3.48% 4.82% 2.23% 3.74% 
Panel B. By Organizational Structures  
  For-profit Nonprofit 
  Chain Ind. Chain Ind. 
Nominal price 2005 151.26 154.486 177.295 192.546 
2006 155.492 162.829 173.03 198.74 
2007 162.95 173.37 185.73 207.47 
2008 172.231 182.222 185.496 216.254 
2009 182.60 189.82 195.638 221.616 
2010 188.95 195.47 225.982 236.575 
% chg. (YoY) 2006 2.79% 5.40% -2.41% 3.22% 
2007 4.80% 6.47% 7.34% 4.39% 
2008 5.70% 5.11% -0.13% 4.24% 
2009 6.02% 4.17% 5.47% 2.48% 
2010 3.48% 2.98% 15.51% 6.75% 
2005-2010 24.91% 26.53% 27.46% 22.87% 
Annualized % chg.  4.55% 4.82% 4.97% 4.20% 
Panel C. By Market Structures  
  Concentration (HHI) Mkt Occupancy 
  <0.15 >=0.15 <Median <=Median 
Nominal price 2005 165 135.66 105.28 162.60 
2006 172.65 137.33 106.28+ 167.38 
2007 181.11 144.95 113.21 178.60 
2008 189.99 148.48 117.90 188.06 
2009 198.78 160.92 130.13 196.92 
2010 205.497 162.56 124.27 209.40 
% chg. (YoY) 2006 4.63% 1.23% 0.96% 2.94% 
2007 4.90% 5.54% 6.51% 6.71% 
2008 4.90% 2.43% 4.15% 5.30% 
2009 4.63% 8.38% 10.37% 4.71% 
2010 3.38% 1.02% -4.50% 6.34% 
2005-2010 24.54% 19.83% 18.04% 28.78% 





Table 3. Regression Results 
  Log (Price) % Chg of Price 
  State FE All State FE >5 
Residents 




State FE >5 
Residents 
County FE >5 
Resdients 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Organizational 
Control 
For-profit -0.0213*** -0.0056 -0.0095 -0.6452 -0.6437 -0.6285 [0.0079] [0.0081] [0.0195] [0.5700] [0.5679] [0.4448] 
Occupancy 
rates 
0.0004* 0.0009*** 0.0008** -0.0205 0.0066 0.0109 
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0174] [0.0182] [0.0152] 
# of beds 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** -0.0017 -0.0003 0.0012 [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0032] 
Nonprofit 
chain 
0.0296*** 0.0400*** 0.0358** -1.062 -0.7299 -1.1714** 
[0.0096] [0.0099] [0.0173] [0.6659] [0.6547] [0.5542] 
For-profit 
chain 
-0.0279*** -0.0383*** -0.0308* 0.8159 0.8976 1.4137** 
[0.0102] [0.0106] [0.0174] [0.7408] [0.7453] [0.6101] 
Medicid-pay 
share (%) 
-0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0008* -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0035 
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0116] [0.0126] [0.0111] 
Medicare-pay 
share (%) 
0.0021*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0494*** 0.0312* 0.0285* 
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0179] [0.0190] [0.0168] 
With hyper-
tension (%) 
-0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0004 0.001 0.004 0.0025 
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0162] [0.0167] [0.0166] 
Female (%) 0.0007*** 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0174 -0.018 -0.0147 [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0210] [0.0228] [0.0203] 
White (%) -0.0001 0.0008*** 0.0020*** -0.0229* 0.0016 0.002 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0005] [0.0126] [0.0150] [0.0153] 
Hispanic (%) 0.0003 0.0014*** -0.0001 0.0091 0.0302 0.0247 [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0006] [0.0177] [0.0242] [0.283] 
Avg. age 0.0035*** 0.0070*** O.046*** -0.0049 -0.0012 0.004 [0.0006] [0.0008] [0.0013] [0.0454] [0.0559] [0.0519] 
Avg. ADL 0.0049*** 0.0039*** 0.0072*** -0.0642 0.0906 0.076 [0.0011] [0.0013] [0.0017] [0.0920] [0.0957] [0.0841] 
Acuity index 0.001 -0.0021 -0.0050* 0.1409 -0.0048 -0.074 [0.0020] [0.0022] [0.0026] [0.1645] [0.1618] [0.1577] 
Market Control 
HHI -0.0747*** -0.1043*** 0.1592*** -0.3066 0.6419 15.2632 [0.0101] [0.0109] [0.0527] [0.8574] [0.9182] [10.1703] 
1000s of 65+ 
per square 
mile 
0.0445*** 0.0478*** 0.1101 0.2498 0.4504 30.1242*** 
[0.0046] [0.0051] [0.2415] [0.4099] [0.4810] [11.5800] 
Log (house-
hold income) 
0.2639*** 0.2573*** 0.1089 -0.3986 0.1237 27.0405*** 
[0.0115] [0.0126] [0.0696] [0.9772] [1.0247] [6.6273] 
Unemploy- 
ment rate 
0.0060*** 0.0027 0.0064** -0.1575 -0.2037* -0.259 
[0.0014] [0.0017] [0.0029] [0.1078] [0.1151] [0.1829] 
State Control 
California 0.3523*** 0.3647***  3.7538** 3.8657**  [0.0183] [0.0202]  [1.8142] [1.8057]  
Florida 0.3929*** 0.3751***  6.4369** 6.8645**  [0.0283] [0.0302]  [2.8802] [2.9008]  
Georgia 0.2315*** 0.2685***  0.0266 0.5424  [0.0107] [0.0119]  [1.0383] [1.0726]  
New York 0.7206*** 0.7055***  9.1467* 9.7010**  [0.0475] [0.0511]  [4.7578] [4.7930]  
Ohio  0.4387*** 0.4417***  4.6543** 4.6431**  [0.0236] [0.0259]  [2.2921] [2.3052]  
Oregon 0.5342*** 05398***  9.4259** 11.9745***  [0.0365] [0.0405]  [3.7240] [3.7598]  
Vermont 0.4856*** 0.4686***  5.7795** 4.9114*  [0.0352] [0.0384]  [2.8578] [2.9103]  
# of observations  22141 16211 16211 18194 13181 13181 
 




Table 4. Subsample Analysis: Market Concentration 
Panel A: Log (Price)  
 Log (Price) 
 State FE All 
HHI <0.15 
State FE All 
HHI >0.15 
State FE >5 
Residents 
HHI <0.15 
State FE >5 
Residents 
HHI >0.15 
County FE >5 
Residents 
HHI <0.15 
County FE >5 
Residents 
HHI >0.15 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
For-profit -0.0215** -0.0207 -0.0019 -0.0131 -0.0071 -0.0165 
[0.0095] [0.0144] [0.0097] [0.0149] [0.0228] [0.0296] 
Nonprofit 
chain 
0.0240** 0.0462*** 0.0416*** 0.0386** 0.0386* 0.0272 
[0.0117] [0.0162] [0.0122] [0.0164] [0.0209] [0.0279] 
For-profit 
chain 
-0.0245** -0.0322* -0.0378*** -0.0279 -0.0321 -0.0251 
[0.0125] [0.0172] [0.0132] [0.0175] [0.0203] [0.0327] 
Occupancy 
rate 
0 0.0012*** 0.0006** 0.0016*** 0.0006 0.0016*** 
[0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0005] 
Medicid-pay 
share (%) 
-0.0016*** 0.0007* -0.0014*** 0.0003 -0.0009* 0.0005 
[0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0002] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0008] 
Medicare-pay 
share (%) 
0.0017*** 0.0028*** 0.0017*** 0.0016** 0.0019*** 0.0015 
[0.0003] [0.0006] [0.0003] [0.0007] [0.0005] [0.0011] 
# of observations 15704 6437 11033 5178 11033 5178 
 
Panel B: % Chg. Of Private Price 
 % Chg of Price 
 State FE All 
HHI <0.15 
State FE All 
HHI >0.15 
State FE >5 
Residents 
HHI <0.15 
State FE >5 
Residents 
HHI >0.15 
County FE >5 
Residents 
HHI <0.15 
County FE >5 
Residents 
HHI >0.15 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
For-profit -0.6014 -0.7483 -0.6362 -0.6291 -0.5936 -0.8664 
[06722] [1.0749] [0.6869] [1.0007] [0.4763] [1.1372] 
Nonprofit 
chain 
-1.2567 -0.932 -0.9611 -0.3279 -1.3155** -0.7328 
[0.7936] [1.2629] [0.8020] [1.1453] [0.6311] [1.1777] 
For-profit 
chain 
1.1768 0.3776 1.2817 0.3231 1.7516** 0.5681 
[0.8867] [1.3897] [0.9202] [1.2780] [0.7008] [1.2996] 
Occupancy 
rate 
-0.0361* 0.0015 0.0048 0.0236 -0.0022 0.0394 
[0.0208] [0.0252] [0.0220] [0.0258] [0.0175] [0.0288] 
Medicid-pay 
share (%) 
-0.007 0.0233 -0.005 0.0174 -0.0056 0.0097 
[0.0130] [0.0287] [0.0144] [0.0294] [0.0118] [0.0330] 
Medicare-pay 
share (%) 
0.0396** 0.1003** 0.0293 0.0388 0.0285 0.0311 
[0.0196] [0.0445] [0.0211] [0.0442] [0.0178] [0.0495] 
# of observations 12969 5225 8989 4192 8989 4192 
 
All regressions include the same control variables as in Table 3. 





Table 5. Market-Level Occupancy Rates 
Panel A: Log (Price)  
 Log (Price) 
 State FE All 
Occup < 
Median 
State FE All 
Occup > 
Median 
















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
For-profit -0.0981*** 0.0223** -0.0799*** 0.0357*** -0.0796*** 0.0332 
[0.0123] [0.0103] [0.0117] [0.0108] [0.0199] [0.0248] 
Nonprofit 
chain 
0.0072 0.325** 0.0205 0.0478*** 0.0133 0.0465* 
[0.0131] [0.0134] [0.0126] [0.0139] [0.0196] [0.0238] 
For-profit 
chain 
0.0213 -0.0500*** 0.0053 -0.0574*** 0.0128 -0.0562** 
[0.0141] [0.0142] [0.0139] [0.0150] [0.0211] [0.0226] 
Medicid-pay 
share (%) 
-00018*** -0.0007*** -0.0016*** -0.0005 -0.0014*** -0.0002 
[0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0007] 
Medicare-pay 
share (%) 
0.0024*** 0.0017*** 0.0018*** 0.0019*** 0.0020*** 0.0019*** 
[0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0006] [0.0007] 
HHI -0.01415*** -0.0929*** -0.0355*** -0.1351*** 0.2385** 0.0832 
[0.0134] [0.0160] [0.0138] [0.0184] [0.0953] [0.0606] 
# of observations 11021 11120 7882 8329 7882 8329 
 
Panel B: % Chg. Of Private Price 
 % Chg of Price 
 State FE All 
Occup < 
Median 
State FE All 
Occup > 
Median 
















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
For-profit 0.1815 -1.1945 0.0448 -1.237 -0.6483 -0.7709 
[0.8975] [0.7365] [0.8552] [0.7542] [0.7322] [0.6226] 
Nonprofit 
chain 
-0.8449 -0.9631 -0. 4089 -0.8119 -1.6324** -0.6681 
[0.9929] [0.9094] [0.9192] [0.9315] [0.8025] [0.8867] 
For-profit 
chain 
-0.0053 1.4208 -0.1535 1.9813* 1.2245 1.7444* 
[1.1045] [1.0049] [1.0621] [1.0436] [0.9040] [0.9488] 
Medicid-pay 
share (%) 
-0.0157 0.0136 -0.0049 0.0027 0.0063 -0.0087 
[0.0174] [0.0159] [0.0181] [0.0178] [0.0172] [0.0158] 
Medicare-pay 
share (%) 
0.0754*** 0.0268 0.0688** 0.0018 0.0752*** -0.0031 
[0.0281] [0.0230] [0.0304] [0.0242] [0.0284] [0.0230] 
HHI 0.3798 -0.3703 1.034 0.3387 29.7808 5.7563 
[1.2582] [1.1273] [1.3761] [1.1877] [19.2918] [5.0453] 
# of observations 9427 8767 6668 6513 6668 6513 
 
All regressions include the same control variables as in Table 3.  
*, **, and ***, represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.   
